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Abstract
From a realist perspective there is a growing body of criminology that can be 
classified as ‘So What?’ criminology in that it involves a low level of theorisation, 
thin, inconsistent or vague concepts and categories, embodies a dubious 
methodology or has little or no policy relevance. The production of ‘So What?’ 
criminology is, of course, no accident but the outcome of a number of lines of 
force that have served to shape the nature of mainstream academic criminology in 
recent years. The aim of this article is to identify some of these lines of force and 
to assess their impact.
Introduction
Over the last twenty years academic criminology has expanded enormously 
in many western countries involving a proliferation of courses, journals and 
conferences. At the same time the social and political impact of academic 
criminology has diminished considerably [17]. Increasingly within academic 
criminology there is a growing body of work that can be designated as “So What?” 
criminology. That is, there an increasing number of publications that are weak 
theoretically, employ dubious methodologies or have little or no discernable policy 
relevance. There are a number of developments that have taken place within the 
sub-discipline of criminology, that have contributed more or less directly to the 
spread of “So What?” criminology. These include the growing influence of 
postmodernism, the demise of critical criminology, the lure of empiricism, a 
widespread pessimism or impossibilism and the adoption of an instrumentalist 
approach to what works.
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In focussing on these developments and examining their impact on 
criminological understanding and social policy, the aim is to build upon previous 
discussions of ‘So What?’ criminology [46]. It has been suggested that 
criminological approaches that ignore class, the state and social structures are 
unlikely to grasp the fundamental dynamics of the criminal justice system and to 
comprehend the relations between structure and agency.
It has also been suggested that the ascendancy of administrative criminology 
and the increasing domination of criminological research by governmental 
agencies has served to shift the emphasis away from critical theorising towards a 
more pragmatic approach that typically result in the production of low level 
equivocal findings. This work, like most forms of pragmatism, often turn out to be 
of limited practical value [73]. The other approach that has gained ground in recent 
years has been liberal criminology in its various forms, which has benefited from 
the demise of conventional conservative criminology that was influential in the 
1980s and which has rapidly declined in significance during the 1990s.
The notion of “So What?” criminology also embraces those studies that 
employ inadequate or inconsistent categories, present purely descriptive accounts, 
focus on the trivial or inconsequential or present the material in an unintelligible 
form. There are also those studies that are purely theoreticist, essentially 
speculative and opinionated, that use limited and selective evidence as well as 
those who fail to follow through the implications of their analysis and typically call 
for more research.
Postmodernism Encounters
Postmodernist thought has not only had a significant impact on social 
sciences in general but has also deeply influenced criminology in a number of 
ways. In particular, it is suspicious towards concepts of truth and falsity as well as 
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expressing incredulity towards metanarratives such as philosophical systems or 
Marxism. In its most damaging forms it expresses a distrust of the idea of 
knowledge having an emancipatory role and instead claims that knowledge is 
relative to the beholder or to a particular social group [42]. Postmodernism 
typically advocates an opposition to ‘objectivism’ and presents an anti-realism. 
However, as a number of critics have pointed out, that in presenting the 
Enlightenment project as an illusion they are themselves presupposing the 
possibility of reduction of illusion and a better way of life. Moreover, in the 
process of rejecting ‘grand narratives’ they invariably construct their own grand 
narratives and overarching schemas, while veering towards relativism and idealism 
[6, 32].
One of the most influential critiques of the Enlightenment project is Carol 
Smart’s rejection of ‘malestream’ criminology [67]. Smart berates criminology for 
what she sees as its adoption of grand narratives and argues instead for situated 
knowledge. Suspicious of what she sees as an essentially male centred 
criminology, she argues that the truth claims of criminology have to be 
deconstructed and challenged from a feminist standpoint. Although rightly 
critiquing situated views of the world that claim to be universal, Smart wants to 
replace these one-sided and partial views with another set of partial views. As John 
Lea has argued [40], replacing the views of the dominant group with those of the 
marginalised, victimised and excluded women is to replace one form of 
fundamentalism with another. In the end Smart muddies the waters rather than 
constructing a basis for the development of a feminist criminology. By advocating 
a form of standpoint feminism together with an anti modernism and anti realism, 
Smart gravitates towards relativism and foundationalism. From this perspective it 
is difficult to see how she might develop a policy response that would reduce rape, 
domestic violence and other crimes that victimise women.
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In a similar vein George Pavlich [52] clams that realist criminology has 
compromised critical thinking by ‘appealing either to anachronism or to 
managerial ways of legitimizing its knowledge claim‘ and becomes a form of 
pragmatism. Drawing on Lyotard’s [43] version of postmodernism he claims that 
critique itself is in danger of becoming unobtainable and that realists have been 
drawn into a fundamentally conservative agenda, operating with a dated (i.e. 
modernist) critical framework. He suggests that the foundations of critical 
criminology have been eroded and questions whether the word ‘critical’ continues 
to have any meaning in the period of ‘late modernity’. From this fundamentally 
defeatist position there is little likelihood of engaging purposefully in the major 
issues on the social and political agenda and the approach ends up in a form of 
postmodern defeatism.
Much of the debate about postmodernism in criminology has been 
submerged in confusion and uncertainty about whether modernist era is over and 
whether the project of developing reform based on the collection and analysis of 
data is now outdated. It is also the case that analysing developments in crime 
control in relation to a supposed transition from modernism to postmodernism has 
been characterised as being ambiguous and uncertain. While Jonathon Simon [65], 
for example, has argued that emerging penal practices are indicators of a 
postmodern penality, others have suggested that these developments represent an 
extension rather than the negation of penal modernism [27, 41]. In contrast, Nancy 
Fraser [25]has argued that it is more appropriate to see developments in social 
regulation not so much in relation to a transition from modernity to late modernity 
or postmodernity, but rather in terms of the transition from Fordism to 
Postfordism. She argues that the nature of disciplinary regimes changed with the 
transition to Fordism and the concomitant rise of the ‘welfare sanction’. Fordism is 
a totalising system of production,  Fraser argues, that instigated a distinctly 
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different mode of regulation based on individual self control ‘, which fosters their 
autonomy as a means to their control’. In the era of Postfordist globalisation, 
however, regulation is becoming decentred and as Giles Deleuze [18] has 
suggested increasingly deinstitutionalised. In this transition to Postfordism the 
forms of hierarchical discipline which Foucault detailed so effectively in 
Discipline and Punish (1977) are increasingly being superseded by a post 
Keynesian, privatised system of control which is multi-layered resulting in what 
Adam Crawford [15] has referred to as ‘networked governance’ or what Nancy 
Fraser [25] calls ‘segmented governmentality’. In Postfordism risk management 
replaces social insurance and the emphasis is increasingly placed on the care of the 
self in which ‘individuals become increasingly responsible for managing their own 
human capital to maximum effect’.  The implication of this form of analysis is that 
it is more productive to analyse the changing forms of crime control in terms of the 
transition to Postfordist modes of regulation rather than in terms of the rather 
nebulous concept of ‘late modernity’. 
Although there is a need to analyse changes in the nature of discipline and 
social control within a wider a wider analytic framework incorporating some 
consideration of changes in productive relations, it remains the case, however, that 
critical realism is tied to the Enlightenment project in as much as it believes in that 
the pursuit of progressive social change should be based on reliable evidence and 
analysis. Thus, rather than see postmodernism as the rejection of the modernist 
project, realists are more sympathetic to Zygmunt Bauman’s [2] conception of 
postmodernism as modernity coming to terms with its own limitations. The 
realisation that the modernist project was inherently contradictory does not detract 
from the objective of using knowledge to effect social reform. 
5
The Demise of Critical Criminology
It is all too easy to forget just how powerful and influential critical and 
radical criminology was in the 1970s in the form of new deviancy theory, labelling 
theory, subcultural theory and neo-Marxist criminologies. The dominant 
conceptions of ‘inclusion’ and ‘exclusion’, ‘normal’ and the ‘pathological’ were 
called into question and the taken-for-granted nature of ‘crime’ was repeatedly 
problematised. These critiques destabilised the hegemonic domination of 
‘conventional’ and ‘positivist’ criminologies and challenged the categories on 
which their analyses had been based. Importantly, critical criminology encouraged 
debates about values, meanings, power and politics [23]. This opened the door for 
a release from the straightjacket of rigid and unreflexive categories and from the 
limited utility of natural scientific methods in criminology.
In many respects this critical input turned conventional criminology on its 
head. The delinquent became the normal in search of kicks and relief from 
boredom. Crime and deviance were seen as being the product of social reaction 
and by implication socially constructed. During much of the 1970s critical 
criminology made considerable ground, but during the following decade it became 
increasingly subject to criticism from a number of directions. It was accused of 
idealism, the romanticisation of the deviant, relativism and ultimately inverting 
rather than transcending the limitations of conventional criminology [75]. Most 
significantly, it was argued, the mode of critique was largely negative and 
dismissive rather than engaged and constructive [13].
In essence, critical criminology failed to develop a credible alternative 
vision, or a perspective that could provide a sustained critique of conventional 
criminology while effectively engaging in the business of practical social reform. 
[70]. The demise of the National Deviancy Conference in 1975 and the absorption 
6
of the critical criminology group within the American Society of Criminology 
some years later signalled the failure of critical criminology to remain independent 
of the mainstream and instead became the ‘bad conscience’ of conventional 
criminology.  
The collapse of communism in Russia in the 1980s and the evaporation of 
the associated socialist vision in the west, suggested that capitalism would not 
wither away and therefore crime and inequality would, in some form, be with us 
for the foreseeable future. This transformation of structures and political visions 
raised nagging issues about freedom, justice, and culpability, which few critical 
criminologists seriously confronted. For the most part critical criminologists 
adopted a liberal notion of individual freedom from state interference and became 
both anti-statist and in many cases anti-punishment. The consequence of this was 
that there was a general tendency to argue for less state ‘interference’, reduced 
levels of punishment and incarceration, greater use of ‘alternatives’ and welfare 
orientated incentives designed to support, educate and manage ‘deviants’ rather 
than punish them [13]. One of the notable exceptions to this liberal vision was 
presented by John Braithwaite and Philip Pettit [5] , who attempted to address the 
questions of why punish, who to punish and what form of punishment is 
appropriate for which type of offender.
A great deal of critical criminology satisfied itself with ideology critique. 
The aim being to show that certain beliefs are false, with the aim of reducing 
illusion. However, less common were attempts to show why such beliefs are held 
and what produces them. Relatively few critiques identify the material conditions 
on which such illusions are based. As Marx demonstrated, it is one of the 
characteristics of the capitalist mode of production that it routinely generates 
representations in distorted and inverted forms. If we are to move beyond ideology 
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critique and expose criminology we need to know exactly how the removal of 
these illusions and distortions could be achieved. 
Critical criminologists for a number of reasons were generally reluctant to 
spell out alternative visions or provide futuristic ‘blueprints’. Consequently many 
critical criminologists during the 1970s and 1980s took refuge under the Thomas 
Mathiesen notion of the ‘unfinished’ and found some solace in the views that 
presenting detailed blueprints of social change was likely to either involve a series 
of practical traps or engage the reformer in collusion and the dilution of objectives. 
Although there is element of truth in Mathiesen’s position since although we 
may be able to identify the causes of social ills we may not in the immediate future 
be able to see a way of eliminating these causes without generating greater 
problems. The difficulty arises, however, that if no feasible or desirable alternative 
is offered the force of critique is weakened and the possibility of mobilising 
support for reform is diminished. Alternatively, some critical criminologists have 
responded to the perceived inability to construct a viable programme of criminal 
justice reforms by embracing forms of anti-criminology, which provides a rationale 
for not engaging in criminal justice reform while paradoxically remaining in the 
criminological camp [13, 33].
A more promising attempt to resurrect critical criminology has come in 
recent years from cultural criminology [21, 23]. Cultural criminologists have 
injected a much needed vitality back into the subject through their engagement 
with the lived experience of deviant and marginalised groups. The emphasis on 
meaning and interpretation has provided an important antidote to the dry and 
uninspiring contributions of administrative and positivistic criminologies. But there 
are issues about meaning and analysis of the key term ‘culture’ since the term can 
have a number of different meanings – value systems, social norms, traditions, 
folkways, habits and the like [28, 51]. Depending on which notion of culture is 
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adopted there are related issues that arise concerning the appropriate form of 
analysis. 
Although cultural criminology claims to offer a ‘ruthless cultural criticism of 
everything existing’, it shares with much conventional criminology and 
postmodernism a disdain of political economy, social structures, the state, grand 
narratives and instead gravitates towards situational and micro-analysis [22, 24, 
31]. Indicatively, it has little purchase on the more serious forms of crime – 
violence, homicide, rape and sexual offences. Moreover, it is difficult to see these 
offences can be properly understood in terms of resistance, edgework or as a 
function of media influences, or so called moral panics. 
At the same time, there is a tendency in some of the contributions to cultural 
criminology to present capitalism as an essentially negative, repressive and 
destructive force, while ‘deviants’ and ‘criminals’ are for the most part seen to be 
engaged in acts of justified resistance. Crime on the other hand is in danger of 
being reduced to a series of representations or discourses or seen as a form of 
drama or carnival [56]. Consequently there is little appreciation of the positive and 
contradictory dynamics of capitalist accumulation and how these shape or 
condition cultural processes, or for that matter how cultural process contribute and 
influence the complexities of capitalist development. 
The separation of the cultural from issues of political economy tends to 
produce a rarefied conception of culture. There is also a tendency in some of the 
contributions to cultural criminology of treating culture as if it were a unified 
phenomena rather than a set of competing norms and values. Indeed, it may well 
be the case that just as the notion of community became the focus of sociological 
attention at the point when traditional communities were breaking down or 
disappearing, so it seems that critical criminologists have come to focus on cultural 
activities at appoint at which ‘culture’ is becoming more diverse, fragmented and 
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contested. It may also be the case that the attraction of cultural criminology may be 
less to do with its contribution to progressive politics, but rather its tendency to 
downplay the nature and impact of crime and focus on ‘deviancy’ and low-level 
transgressions in a period of a rapid crime drop, and in a context in which crime 
itself is sliding down the social and political agenda [37]. On the other hand, the 
crime drop itself may be a function of as yet largely unexamined cultural shifts [4, 
38].
The promise of cultural criminology is yet be realised but there is a concern 
that like previous versions of critical criminology that rather than confronting and 
seriously challenging the hegemony of conventional criminology that it becomes 
absorbed in within the mainstream providing more of a change of emphasis rather 
than a change of direction. The lack of clarity about the nature of its object of 
investigation – culture – and of the appropriate methods to study, it presents an 
eclectic and uncoordinated set of approaches that lack an identifiable political 
focus.
However, developing an overtly critical approach to criminology remains an 
important objective if we are to explore the emancipatory potential of the subject. 
Picking up the critical baton that criminology requires, it has been suggested, calls 
for an engaged approach that goes beyond ideology critique and ‘the unfinished’ to 
the identification of viable alternatives, together with strategies and visions of how 
these alternatives could be realised. From a realist perspective if cultural 
criminology is to be worthwhile, it needs to be critical of its object. It also needs to 
avoid cultural reductionism and rather than reducing considerations of political 
economy into the ‘lifeworlds’ or seeing capitalism in exclusively negative terms, it 
needs to recognise that cultural forms contain progressive as well as destructive 
elements and that part of the debate is making distinctions between contradictory 
and competing cultural forms [44, 58]. 
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The Lure of Empiricism
The problem of method in social science has centred around the opposition 
between deductivism and inductivism and correspondingly between realism and 
empiricism. Empiricism, or positivism, in the philosophy of science is broadly 
speaking the view that scientific investigation can be confined to observable 
phenomena and their formal relations, while realism embodies the view that there 
is a reality independent of our knowledge of it and that this reality is stratified 
containing emergent properties whose effects should not be conflated with our 
experience of them [3, 19]. Whereas empiricism is inductive and believes that 
‘facts speak for themselves’ and that theories can be constructed by gathering and 
sifting of data, realists believe that social scientific investigation should be theory 
led and that it is our theories and concepts that serve to carve up the world and 
make sense of the multitude of ‘facts’ that comprise the real world [45]. 
For the most part empiricists emulate the methods of the natural sciences 
and frequently claim that their endeavours are ‘scientific’, whereas realism 
maintains that social scientific investigation necessarily involves the interpretation 
of human meaning, intentions and actions, and therefore requires a range of 
methods, the choice of which will be dependent on the nature of object under study 
and what one wants to learn about it. Realists argue that because social systems are 
always open and usually quite complex and messy, it is very difficult if not 
impossible to isolate the components that we want to examine under controlled 
conditions as may occur in the natural sciences [61, 62].
As C. Wright Mills argues in The Sociological Imagination (1959) 
abstracted empiricism tends to be a-theoretical with little conception of the 
historical and social forces that shape both natural and social scientific 
investigation. Indeed, where structural and historical factors are used in empiricist 
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studies they are often ‘above’ the level of the data made available in the research, 
or alternatively refer to psychological factors that operate ‘below’ the level of data 
presented. Typically when literature reviews are conducted Mills suggests it is not 
to develop a theory, test assumptions or to give the study meaning but in many 
cases the literature review is presented independently of the research report and is 
often written up after the data is collected.
Despite warnings from C. Wright Mills and other major sociologists, 
empiricism and positivism remain prevalent in social science in general and 
criminology in particular. The growing body of government sponsored 
administrative criminology represents one of the most prominent examples of 
empiricism. Typically light in theory and heavy on statistical manipulation, these 
studies collect data on different aspects of crime, victimisation and the operation of 
the criminal justice system such that much of this work is often small scale, 
localised and descriptive producing equivocal conclusions. A major limitation of 
these studies is that they make little contribution to the development of cumulative 
knowledge and theory building.
Empiricism, however, can take a number of forms, some of which are more 
subtle than the usual form of abstracted empiricism. For example, a popular 
strategy in criminology is to take two phenomena that appear to be changing 
simultaneously in related ways and to claim that one must be causing the changes 
in the other. Identifying these forms of correspondence has become a major 
preoccupation for criminologists, even amongst those who have radical 
pretensions. One of the most influential representatives of this form of empiricism 
is Loic Wacquant [71, 72] who has presented a number of explanations of the 
changing nature of crime control on the basis of observing two phenomena 
changing simultaneously. Thus he observes the decline of the ghetto in the US and 
the expansion of the prison, and concludes that the prison must be replacing the 
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ghetto. In a similar vein he sees the demise of the Keynesian welfare state and the 
simultaneous growth of the prison and concludes that they must be functionally 
related. In addition, he claims that the rise of the prison population in the US is a 
function of the rise of neo-liberalism and postmodern insecurity, despite the fact 
that the number of people prisons has decreased in periods of neo-liberalism (as 
occurred in the Thatcher era) and seems impervious to the fact that neo-liberals are 
generally interested in minimal statism rather than expanding state provision, 
particularly in the very expensive form of incarceration. 
It is also the case that he widespread claim of criminologists that we are 
experiencing a surge of ‘populist punitiveness’ fails to recognise that there is no 
automatic relation between changing forms of political economy, cultural forms 
and political structures that that leads directly or inevitably towards the formation 
of punitive sensibilities. Taking the same logic it might be expected that in a period 
of rapid social and economic change involving the fragmentation of communities, 
growing inequalities and the breakdown of informal controls that crime would rise 
significantly. However, the opposite has occurred. This may well be because the 
sensibilities and identities in the Postfordist era require not so much an emphasis 
on toughness and rigidity as on flexibility and ambivalence [2, 63]. In modern 
parlance the key terms are ‘being cool’ and ‘having respect’. It is relation to 
flexibility - personal and social and economic - that people are judged and valued 
in contemporary society, whereas punitiveness is more likely to be seen as ‘uncool’ 
and as an indicator of rigidity.
In the same way there is little evidence of declining welfare budgets in most 
advanced western countries that have expanding prison populations and that even 
in the US states such as California significantly increased welfare expenditure in 
the 1990s as prison populations were expanding [30]. It would seem that it is not 
so much a question of a reduction in welfare expenditure per se, but of the 
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reorganisation and redistribution of welfare. The attractiveness of this form of 
functionalist empiricism is not difficult to understand for those who want simplistic 
answers to complex issues. These types of accounts are superficially attractive, but 
the complex ways in which these phenomena may be connected are not explored, 
and it is the regularity of their appearance that provides the (questionable) basis of 
explanation. However, as critical realists argue, what causes something to happen 
has nothing to do with the number of times that we have observed it happening 
[62,  53].
Another prevalent example of empiricism involves what we might call 
inverted empiricism. This is the approach that assumes that because we cannot 
observe regular corresponding changes in two phenomena they cannot be causally 
related. This type of empiricism is evident in the majority of studies in criminology 
on the relationship between crime rates and the prison population. Since 
imprisonment rates have increased significantly over the last decade or so in the 
UK and in America, while the recorded crime rates have fallen, it is frequently 
concluded that there is no discernable causal link between the crime rate and 
imprisonment rate. Thus Michael Tonry, for example, in his book Penal reform in 
Overcrowded Times can assert in a section entitled ‘crude empiricism’ that the 
‘explanation for why so many Americans are in prison, that our crime rates are 
higher or faster rising than in other countries, has virtually no validity’ [69:54]. 
Having made this statement he draws on the International Crime Victimisation 
Survey, which is one of the crudest examples of criminological empiricism, to 
show that the chances of being burgled in the US are lower than most European 
countries, although he concedes that violent crime is much higher in the US than 
most other countries. Thus in an impressive piece of logic, Tonry, who is seen as 
one of the leading international experts on punishment and imprisonment 
concludes his discussion on ‘crude empiricism’ with the startling and unverified 
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claim that: “American imprisonment rates rose because American politicians 
wanted them to rise.” [69:57]. Thus the complex dynamics of prison expansion are 
reduced to a form of voluntarism. 
However, it makes little sense to compare changes in the overall recorded 
crime rate and the imprisonment rate since a large percentage of recorded crimes 
are unlikely to warrant a prison sentence. To better understand the connection we 
need to examine the process of attrition, particularly for those offences that are 
highly likely to end in a prison sentence if the offender is found guilty and to 
examine the forms of decision-making at various points in the criminal justice 
system, particularly by the police and sentencers. The causal connections between 
different types of crime may be indirect, heavily mediated and subject to an array 
of different forces and forms of decision-making, but it does not mean that causal 
connections cannot be identified [47].
If we look, for example, at the growth of women’s imprisonment over the 
past decade or so in different countries such as America, Canada, Australia and 
England and Wales there does seem to be a causal connection between the growing 
number of women prosecuted and convicted of various crimes, particularly 
violence and the growth of women’s imprisonment [29, 39, 59]. It may be the case 
as Meda Chesney-Lind [11] has argued that this may be a function to some extent 
of a redefining and re-categorisation of women’s actions but there can be little 
doubt that the growing number of convictions and prosecutions for relatively 
serious crimes his causally related to the growing number of women incarcerated 
in these countries. The problem as always is that there are a number of causal 
processes in play with different, and at times contrasting, impacts. Our aim 
however, should not be to engage in a fruitless and meaningless form of inverted 
empiricism but instead to identify the causal mechanisms which shape and produce 
the outcomes that we are examining. Moreover, the denial of any meaningful 
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relation between recorded crime rates and imprisonment is one of the major 
conceptual fault lines that runs through criminology, creating almost two distinct 
sub-disciplines of ‘crime’ and ‘punishment’ that are studied independently from 
each other, with the consequence that punishment tends to appear arbitrary. This in 
turn makes informed and normative discussions of punishment and imprisonment 
extremely difficult and at the same time tends to disconnect academic 
criminologists from the concerns of the public and policy makers. 
Thus in order to avoid the excess of voluntarism and reductionism realists 
place considerable emphasis on causal explanations. The main objective is to 
distinguish the causal from the contingent. Rather than engage in empiricism with 
its interest in statistical correlations and recurring events, or be satisfied with pure 
descriptions, realists are concerned with the question of ‘why’ change occurs and 
in identifying the causal dynamics that produce non-random outcomes. 
Pessimism and Impossibilism 
A general reading of recent criminological literature could reasonably lead 
one to the conclusion that many criminologists believe that things are getting 
worse. Growing public anxieties, increased prison populations, tougher policing, 
and in general belief that are living under a dark cloud of ‘populist punitiveness’ 
are the types of messages that criminologists like to deliver [20, 55, 66]. Thus, 
many criminologists see themselves as disseminators of bad news and there can be 
little doubt that a considerable number of criminologists are most comfortable 
when presenting dystopic visions [36, 76]. 
In conjunction with this widespread pessimism there is a cynicism that 
claims explicitly or implicitly that interventions do not or cannot work and 
whenever any new policy initiatives are developed these cynics they feel obliged to 
give a list of reasons why they will not work. In very few cases do these pessimists 
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explain what might work and instead prefer to occupy the safer terrain of non-
interventionism. 
Let us take an example of pessimism - the project of penal reform. There is a 
widespread consensus amongst academic criminologists that prisons consistently 
fail in terms of their designated goals of reforming offenders or reducing crime, or 
increasing public safety. The dominant response to the perceived ‘failure’ of 
imprisonment is either reductionism or abolitionism. Although there are a number 
of different penal reform strategies available such as changing sentencing policy, 
privatisation, modifying regimes and staff-inmate relations the strategies of penal 
reform boil down essentially to a choice between reductionism and abolitionism 
[35, 37]. 
The mantra of reductionism is that there are, by definition, too many people 
in prison and the objective is to reduce the number. However, reductionists are 
very uncertain about the degree of reduction that should take place and by 
implication, how many people should be in prison. The logic of reductionism is 
that however many people there are in prison it is always going to be too many. 
The favoured strategy for reducing the prison population amongst reductionists is 
developing community based ‘alternatives’. However, the research shows that 
‘alternatives’ tend to involve net widening and that rather than reduce the level of 
imprisonment they help to create an expanded network of criminal justice and 
related agencies that provide a systematic form of recruitment and referral into the 
prison system [12].
Abolitionists on the other hand, partly in response to the perceived limitations 
of reductionism and reformism, argue that some or all groups of offenders should 
be ineligible for imprisonment and that custodial institutions should be closed 
down and phased out [64]. One of the leading abolitionists, Pat Carlen [9], has 
argued for a gender based abolitionist strategy such that women convicted of the 
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same offence as men would, apart from a few exceptional cases, not be subject to 
incarceration. She argues that penal reform is either ineffective or 
counterproductive and has coined the term ‘carceral clawback’, which refers to the 
process by which certain gains made through reforms are seen to be countered by 
other managerial or organisational imperatives. A survey of her writings on penal 
reform represents a very pessimistic vision. In general her approach can be 
summarised in the following form:
• However much you improve conditions, a ‘prison is a prison’ which 
deprives people of their liberty
• There is always a mismatch between intentions and outcomes, and therefore 
reform is always likely to fail
• You may change or improve certain aspects of incarceration but the 
overarching structure remains intact
• There may be some improvements, but you could have done something else 
that could have been better
These arguments against reformism have, of course, been applied to other areas. 
The underlying argument is that if you do manage to improve conditions that you 
just relegitimise the prison or the criminal justice system and reinforce and extend 
its powers. On the other hand, if you do not improve conditions the offenders will 
become more damaged and more marginalised which will make them more prone 
to offending. This ‘no win’ scenario is a regular feature of the writings of liberal 
pessimists and provides a major obstacle to the development of constructive and 
progressive reforms in different areas of criminal justice. Indeed, it is possible to 
trace a line of pessimism that runs through postmodern defeatism, the more 
negative forms of critical criminology and amongst liberal pessimists.
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What Works?
Over the past twenty years or so the dominant ideology in criminology has 
shifted from a ‘nothing works’ position to a focus on ‘what works’ [16]. 
Developing an evidence based approach criminologists have attempted to 
overcome the nihilism of the ‘nothing works’ era with the systematic marshalling 
of evidence in order to produce more viable and effective policies. Although there 
has been something of a welcome break with the pessimism and impossibilism of 
the ‘nothing works’ position, the new focus on finding out what works has been 
less impressive than was generally expected. This is largely because the strategies 
employed to find out what works have been typically theoretically weak and/or 
methodologically inadequate and operated with a largely instrumentalist 
conception of what works.
One example of the development of an evidence based approach to what 
works has centred around the adoption of the ‘experimental paradigm’ advocated 
by Donald Campbell and his associates, which attempt to design social research in 
a manner that emulates the rules and precepts of natural scientific investigation, 
particularly in line with those adopted in medicine and health care [14]. Although 
the Campbell group aim to develop an evidence based approach to policy, the 
application of their scientific approach to the complex ‘open systems’ of the social 
world has proved to be less than adequate [68]. Similarly, the use of random 
control trials in which there is normally an experimental group which is subject to 
‘treatment’ and a control group which is not, such that any difference in the change 
between the experimental group and the control group is seen to be attributable to 
the intervention, have also been shown to have serious limitations. These studies 
can often produce mixed findings, while it is rarely acknowledged that the 
intervention itself may more or less directly affect the outcomes.
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Most significantly, the problem is that the same measure may work in 
different ways in different settings and have different effects according to 
variations in the circumstances of those involved. Thus instead of boldly claiming 
that certain interventions (always) ‘work’, it may be more appropriate and more 
realistic to claim that certain interventions work for some people in some 
conditions some of the time.
One instructive example of the limitations of recent government funded 
research, which aims to provide evidence based policy, is a reducing burglary 
initiative conducted by a consortium in the UK. In this research the original finding 
was that the initiative had limited impact. However the data was reworked by the 
Home Office to show an improvement in the outcomes, claiming a 25 per cent 
drop in burglary Thus the conclusion of this work was that if an intervention does 
not in fact work, that rather than find out why it did not work, the preferred official 
response in this case at least is, as Tim Hope has argued, to ‘pretend it works’ [34].
A further example of the limits of attempts to establish ‘what works’ is the 
assessments of Cognitive Behavioural Programmes (CBT). Recent research by the 
Home Office and the Youth Justice Board claim that CBT can be effective in 
reducing reoffending [7]. However, the research carried out by the Home Office 
indicate that such programmes rarely ‘work’ as intended and that dropout rates are 
very high and that in those rare instances where there is an improvement in re-
conviction rates following an intervention, John Pitts [57] has argued that it is not 
clear for whom it has worked or why it has worked. 
Also in relation to Cognitive Behavioural Therapy (CBT) Pawson and Tilley 
[54] demonstrate that the selection of the different groups on which CBT is 
exercised skews the results and they conclude in their review of the evidence that 
the group which demonstrated the greatest success were those who were eligible 
for CBT but did not participate in the programme. These errors and omissions, 
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which severely detract from the reliability of the research, have not prevented the 
widespread adoption of these programmes by governments and prison 
departments. The important point that Pawson and Tilley make in relation to these 
programmes is that they cannot be evaluated without some appreciation of the 
population to which they are directed and the context in which they takes place. 
The implication is that very few interventions work for all subjects in all contexts, 
and that it is not that interventions ‘work’ unconditionally, but that they ‘work’ to 
the extent that they connect with the capacities, aspirations and interests of those to 
whom they are directed. Those interests and capacities will in turn be conditioned 
by the context in which the interventions occur. Just as the capacity of gun powder 
to explode is conditioned by the context (i.e. whether it is wet or dry) in which it is 
placed, the capacity of interventions to ‘fire’ will be dependent on the context in 
which they are deployed. Since it is usually a multiplicity of causes that produce 
one event rather than a single cause, the challenge is to identify the generative 
causal connections and to discount contingent connections. Answering this 
question requires systematic empirical investigation.
In contrast to the instrumentalist view of ‘what works’, critical realists 
operate with a different view of intervention and its effects. Interventions are not 
so much concerned with applying known remedies to problematic situations but 
implementing theories about what might work. Interventions involve a number of 
different stages and will be applied in different ways in different contexts. 
Ray Pawson [53] has argued that the influence of research in policy often 
occurs through the medium of ideas rather than that of data. That is, it is not so 
much the discovery of an impressive ‘fact’ that changes the course of policy 
making, rather research contributes to the clash of ideas and ‘the key to 
enlightenment is to insinuate research results into this reckoning’. Thus it is the 
explanations not the numerical results from reviews and research that speak 
21
directly to the choices that have to be made in devising or reforming a programme. 
Thus:
“Policy-makers are likely to struggle with data that reveal for instance, the 
respective significance of an array of mediators and moderators in meta-
analysis. They are more likely to be able to interpret and to utilise a full-
blown realist explanation of why a programme theory works better in one 
context than another. Although these two investigatory thoughts serve to 
answer rather similar questions, the one that focuses on sense making has 
the advantage. This is especially so if the investigation focuses on 
adjudicating between rival explanations, thus providing the justification for 
taking one course of action rather than another. This is the very stuff of 
political decision-making.” [53:169].
Conclusion
This article is to some extent guilty of the charges laid against the pessimists 
by dwelling on the negative developments in academic criminology. However, if 
we are to develop a more critical and engaged form of criminological investigation 
there is a considerable amount of path clearing and rethinking that needs to be 
undertaken. 
It has been suggested that the demise of critical criminology has facilitated 
the drift back towards the adoption of natural scientific approaches employing 
inappropriate methods to study social phenomena. In the process not only has 
criminology lost much of its critical edge, but also increasingly operates with 
taken–for-granted commonsensical categories of crime. At the same time there has 
been a decrease in overt forms of overt political commitment and normative 
theorising.
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The ascendancy of administrative criminology, which is notably light on 
theory and adopts undeconstructed commonsense categories, is ultimately of 
limited utility. In opposition to these approaches there is a need to build on the 
renewed vitality of critical criminology which has been generated by cultural 
criminologists, that is able to produce an engaged, progressive political approach, 
that is based on rigorous methodology and that can integrate the study of ‘culture’ 
in a non reductionist manner. Thus one of the immediate tasks of ‘cultural realism’ 
is to integrate the work of cultural criminologists into a left social democratic 
programme that can provide the normative and political vantage point on which to 
base research programmes and develop progressive interventions.
The development of such a programme would help to counter the deep-
seated pessimism and impossibilism that runs through criminology. Doing nothing 
or trying to find reasons why proposed interventions are destined to fail creates a 
form of disengagement that allows policy makers and politicians a relatively free 
hand to orchestrate criminal justice policy. These issues, however, are too 
important to be left to politicians and policy makers alone.  Although pessimism 
and impossibilism are a long-standing feature of criminology, the recent wave of 
postmodernism has exacerbated these tendencies by advocating forms of relativism 
and defeatism. In opposition, critical realism remains tied to a modernist 
problematic and to the process of social reform through the collection of evidence 
based on sound methodologies. 
Finally, it is interesting to note that in the UK academic production in the 
future is to be evaluated not solely in terms of the number of citations and 
publications but increasingly in relation to their ‘impact’. Although there are 
considerable difficulties in determining exactly how ‘impact’ is to be measured and 
assessed, this development does potentially represent a positive initiative in that it 
may encourage academics to make their work more policy relevant. However, if 
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these contributions to policy and practice are to be positive some serious 
consideration needs to be given to the use of the concepts and categories that frame 
research and to the methodologies and forms of analysis that are adopted. 
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